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Taylor R. Thompson 
 
 The Eastern Louisiana District Court upheld Amendment 40 to 
the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council’s Reef Management 
Plan. The court held that the Gulf Council and the National Marine 
Fisheries Service’s proposed rule establishing fishing quotas for the red 
snapper met all of the statutory guidelines imposed under the 
Magnusson-Stevens Act.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
At issue in Coastal Conservation Association v. United States 
Department of Commerce was whether Amendment 40 to the Gulf of 
Mexico Fishery Management Council’s (“Gulf Council”) Reef 
Management Plan (“Plan”) should be invalidated pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 1  The plaintiffs, Coastal 
Conservation Association (“CCA”) and three named members 
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) objected to the rule that would change the 
management of recreational red snapper fishing. 2  The defendants 
included the United States Department of Commerce (“USDOC”), the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) (collectively “Federal 
Defendants”).3 After a thorough review of the regulatory process, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
ultimately granted summary judgment to Federal Defendants.4   
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Statutory Background 
 
The dispute involved red snapper fishery management in the 
Gulf of Mexico, which is regulated by the Gulf Council. 5  Fisheries 
                                                 
1.  Coastal Conservation Ass'n v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 15-
1300, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 727, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2016). 
2.      Id. at *6.  
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. at *23. 
5.  Id. at *3. 
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nationwide are regulated pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
(“MSA”) for the purpose of conserving and managing fishery resources.6 
The MSA created eight Regional Fishery Management Councils that are 
responsible for preparing Fishery Management Plans (“FMP”) to address 
conservation and management of fisheries within their region.7 Every 
FMP “must be consistent with ten National Standards” as enumerated per 
the MSA;8 however, only three are at issue in the case.9 Management of 
Gulf of Mexico red snapper is also addressed individually in the MSA 
and requires that any FMP adopted by the Gulf Council must “establish 
separate quotas for recreational . . . and commercial fishing that, when 
reached, result in a prohibition on the retention of fish caught . . . for the 
remainder of the year.”10 
A FMP has regulatory effect once it goes through the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process. 11  The process begins when the Gulf 
Council submits the proposed FMP to the Secretary of Commerce 
through the NMFS.12 Then, the NMFS reviews the plan and publishes the 
final regulation in the Federal Register.13 Once published in the Federal 
Register, the FMP has the full force of law.14  
 
B.  Standard of Review 
 
 The MSA is subject to judicial review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”), which allows a decision to be overturned only if 
the agency action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion.”15 The 
court also follows the two-step judicial review of agency action outlined 
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Fund when an 
agency’s interpretation of the law is challenged.16 Under Chevron, the 
first question the court must ask is whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise issue; if Congress has spoken to the issue, the inquiry 
stops.17 However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court then asks 
                                                 
6.  16 U.S.C. § 1801 (2007). 
7.  Coastal, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 727, at *3 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 
1852(h)(1) (2007)). 
8. Id. at *4 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (2007)). 
9. Id. at *3. 
10.  Id. at *6 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1883 (2007)).  
11.  Id. at *4. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15.  Id. at *7. 
16.  467 U.S. 837 (1984).    
17.  Coastal, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 727, at *10. 
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whether the agency interpretation is “based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.”18  
 
C.  Factual Background 
 
 For the past fifteen years the Gulf Council has attempted to 
rebuild the red snapper fishery by using various management methods.19 
One method has been to limit the recreational sector’s ability to fish by 
shortening the fishing season. 20  However, rebuilding plans were 
complicated by conflicting state management of the recreational red 
snapper season, which has longer seasons and higher bag limits than the 
federal rebuilding plan.21 Despite all the management steps taken, the 
total red snapper catch has exceeded the federal recreational quota each 
year except 2010.22  
 Amendment 40 provides for more flexible management of the 
recreational sector by dividing it into two components: first, a federal-
for-hire component made up of charter fisherman with federal permits; 
and second, a private angling component with private anglers and state-
licensed charter fisherman.23 Amendment 40 allocates the recreational 
red snapper quota differently and provides separate season closures 
between the two components.24 The recreational fishing quota allocates 
42.3 percent to component one, the charter fisherman with federal 
permits, and 57.7 percent to component two, the private angling 
component.25 CAA alleged that Amendment 40 would harm its members 
because it would “reduce the maximum quantity of red snapper that 
individual recreational fisherman can catch.”26  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Regulating Charter/Headboat Separately Okay  
  
Plaintiffs contended that specific language in the MSA precludes 
further separation of the red snapper sectors, which “impermissibly 
                                                 
18.   Id. 
19. Id. at *7-8. 
20. Id. at *7. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. at *7-8. 
23.  Id. at *8. 
24.  Id.  
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. 
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creates three sectors.” 27  To support this, Plaintiffs relied on two 
principles of statutory construction, which the court refused to analyze, 
instead using the Chevron standard to resolve the dispute.28 The first 
Chevron standard mandates the court decide whether Congress has 
“directly spoken to the issue at hand.”29 Applying this standard, the court 
held that Section 407 of the MSA did not “impose a facial prohibition on 
further subdivision of the recreational sector” by imposing sub-quotas.30 
Instead, Section 407 directs the Gulf Council to enact measures that it 
deems “necessary and proper” to manage the fishery.31 The court found 
this language to be a broad delegation of authority to the agency.32  
The court then moved to the second Chevron prong, which 
requires the court to “consider whether the action taken by the agency is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.”33 Finding the first 
prong satisfied, the court could only overturn the agency’s action if it 
was “arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute.”34 The 
court found that Amendment 40 was not arbitrary and capricious because 
FMPs routinely set different sub-quotas based on various factors that 
have been upheld by other courts.35  The court went on to hold that 
Federal Defendant’s had “clearly identified a rational basis” in their 
decision to improve management of the recreational sector, because the 
division would “aid in efficient management” of the recreational sector.36  
 
B.  National Standard 8 and 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(9)  
 
 Plaintiffs next asserted Amendment 40 did not comply with 
National Standard 8 and 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(9).37 National Standard 8 
demands that the NMFS must take into account “the importance of 
fishery resources to fishing communities by utilizing economic and 
social data,” and that “conservation and management measures” must be 
based on the best available scientific data. 38  In analyzing National 
Standards, courts have noted that these studies could go on forever, so 
                                                 
27. Id. at *12 
 28. Id. at *14.  
29.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
30. Id. 
31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at *15 
 34.  Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 
35.  Id. at *16. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. at *17. 
38.  Id. 
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the analysis should focus on whether the Secretary of Commerce has 
considered the impacts and alternatives to the plan he adopts.39 If there is 
superior or contrary data available that the agency ignored, then an 
agency’s collection and reliance on scientific information will be 
questioned.40  
 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(9) requires that the Fishery Impact 
Statement include the likely economic and social effects of an 
amendment.41 Plaintiffs argued that a more powerful, affirmative duty 
existed to collect data on potential economic and social effects, but cited 
no law to support this contention. 42  The court determined Federal 
Defendants used the best scientific information available and Plaintiffs 
did not point to any data supporting their argument.43 Therefore, after 
careful analysis, the court found for Federal Defendants and concluded it 
could not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.44 
 
C.  Amendment 40 Does Not Violate National Standard 4 
  
Plaintiffs further asserted Amendment 40 violated National 
Standard 4 when it divided the recreational sector into two components.45 
Plaintiffs believed that Federal Defendants “did not measure the impacts 
of the allocation on the affected groups.”46 Plaintiffs argued Amendment 
40 violated National Standard 4 in three ways: first, it discriminated 
against recreational anglers; second, it discriminated against people from 
different states; and third, the decision to average catch numbers to 
decide quota allocations was arbitrary and capricious.47  
The record reflected that the detriment to the private anglers 
would be offset by their ability to fish in state waters. 48  The court 
disagreed with Plaintiffs, finding that the Gulf Council’s decision was 
not arbitrary and capricious because the Council gave a “rational 
justification for its decision” to allocate fish differently between the 
private angling component and the federal-for-hire component.49 
                                                 
39.  Id. at *18. 
40.  Id. at *18-19. 
41.  Id. at *17. 
42.  Id.  
43.  Id. at *19. 
44.  Id. at *19-21. 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. at *22. 
47.  Id. at *40. 
48.  Id. at *23-24. 
49.  Id. at *24. 
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The second argument asserted by Plaintiffs was that Amendment 
40 was unlawful because it would discriminate against residents from 
other states. 50  They argued discriminatory effects and discriminatory 
intent against residents from other states were equally prohibited. 51 
However, the court found that this was not supported by case law.52 The 
court held that the discrimination between different states was “merely 
incidental to the purpose and execution” of Amendment 40. 53 
Additionally, there was no state-based allocation within Amendment 40 
and National Standard 4 was not implicated.54 
Finally, Plaintiffs argued that basing quota allocations on the 
average of the 2006 to 2013 catches and 1986 to 2013 numbers was 
arbitrary and capricious.55 The court disagreed and found the Council 
provided a valid justification for its decision to include the older data in 
the allocation decisions.56 
 
D.  Gulf Council Did Not Unlawfully Delegate Authority to NMFS 
 
 Plaintiffs further argued the Gulf Council was not allowed to 
delegate the final allocation percentages to the NMFS without the Gulf 
Council’s approval.57 Plaintiffs believed the delegation violated the MSA 
because the NMFS did not have the power to change substantive actions 
that were approved by the Council.58 Plaintiff relied on Fishing Company 
of Alaska, Inc. v. Gutierrez, in which the North Pacific Fisheries Council 
never adopted the substantive enforcement provisions put forward by the 
NMFS.59 The court found Plaintiffs’ reliance on Fishing Company of 
Alaska, Inc. v. Gutierrez unpersuasive because the changes made 
between the two versions were not substantive.60  The delegation was 
proper because the changes made between the Council’s approval of 
Amendment 40 and the final allocation set by the NMFS was well within 
the range approved by the Council.61 At the time Amendment 40 was 
submitted to NMFS there was an ongoing workshop to evaluate the 
                                                 
50.  Id. at *25. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. at *26. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. at *27. 
58.  Id. 
59. Id. at *28. 
60. Id. 
61.  Id. 
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methods to appropriately calibrate the data and the Council approved the 
later incorporation of the data into the final rule.62 Therefore, the court 
found that there was no improper delegation of authority to NMFS in 
order to set the final allocation percentage.63  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The court granted summary judgment to Federal Defendants, 
finding that Amendment 40 was decided in accordance with the APA 
and the Chevron two-prong test. The court consistently argued that the 
CCA had not met their burden of proof in arguing their side. This 
decision will allow Amendment 40 to remain in effect, which will 
hopefully snap the fishery back to life. 
                                                 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. 
